Baker v. Baker : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Baker v. Baker : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kellie F. Williams; Corporon & Williams; Attorney for Appellant.
James P. Cowley; Clark K. Taylor; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Baker v. Baker, No. 920314 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3243
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. 9?Q3/y 
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
DAN BAKER, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
LUJUANA BAKER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920314-CA 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
This is an appeal from the Third District Court's 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on or about April 16, 1992. 
The Honorable David S. Young, Presiding 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
James P. Cowley #0739 
Clark K. Taylor #5354 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Kellie F. Williams 
Attorney for Appellant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
FILED 
SEP 18 1992 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
DAN BAKER, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
LUJUANA BAKER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920314-CA 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
This is an appeal from the Third District Court's 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on or about April 16, 1992. 
The Honorable David S. Young, Presiding 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
James P. Cowley #0739 
Clark K. Taylor #5354 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Kellie F. Williams 
Attorney for Appellant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT -1-
ISSUES FOR REVIEW .' -1-
STANDARD OF REVIEW -1-
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. RULES. ETC.-l-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE -2-
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED . . . -2-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS -4-
ARGUMENT -7-
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION OR 
ERR IN ORDERING THE SALE 
OF THE MARITAL 
RESIDENCE -7-
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
THE DIVISION OF THE 
MORTGAGE PAYMENTS PENDING 
SALE OF THE MARITAL 
RESIDENCE -14-
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING THE DEFENDANT 
CHILD SUPPORT AT THE 
LEVEL OF ONE THOUSAND SIX 
HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($1,600.00) PER MONTH -16-
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING THE DEFENDANT 
ALIMONY AT THE LEVEL OF 
ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($1,400.00) PER 
MONTH -23-
g:\wpc\185\00001iri.WSl - 1 -
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE 
ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE ALIMONY AWARD 
AND THE ALIMONY AWARD IS ADEQUATE -23-
B. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT 
CONSIDERING THE EXPENSES ATTENDANT TO 
THE GRANDCHILDREN -29-
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR OR ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN THE 
DIVISION OF THE MARITAL 
ESTATE -31-
POINT VI: PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE 
AWARDED HIS ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL -39-
CONCLUSION -40-
APPENDICES -43-
g:\wpc\185\00001iri.W51 - 1 1 -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108 (Utah App. 1990) . . -16-, -17-
Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App.-1991) -23-
Blackman v. Blackman. 517 N.Y.S.2d 167 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1987) -13-
Cummings v. Oimmings. 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991) -1-
Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990) -33-
Enalish v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977) -23-
Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, (Utah 1988) . . . -24-, -28-
Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991) -1-
Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) -23-
Lyngle v. Lyngle. 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992) -40-
Peterson v. Peterson. 748 P.2d 593 (Utah App. 1988) . -10-, -11-
-13-
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 -17-
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (h) (1953) -1-
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.12 -2-, -18-, -19-, -22-
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2(3) -18-
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2) (1987) -16-
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(3) -18-, -19-
Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-3 to 4 -30-
Utah R. App. P. 3 and 4 -1-
g:\wpc\185\00001in.W51 - i l l -
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann, (1953) and pursuant to Rules 3 
and 4 of the Utah R. App. P. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The Brief of Appellant adequately states the issues 
presented for review. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
With respect to the issues presented for review, 
defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion. 
Trial courts have considerable discretion in divorce cases in 
determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, 
and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion is demonstrated. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 
1211 (Utah App. 1991). Further, findings of fact in divorce 
appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. 
Id. The trial court's factual determinations are clearly 
erroneous only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court has a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. Cummings v. Cummings. 
821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, RULES. ETC. 
There is no statutory authority believed by plaintiff 
to be wholly determinative of the issues raised on appeal. 
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However, the interpretation of §78-45-7.12 Utah Code Ann.. quoted 
below, is determinative with respect to child support: 
If the combined adjusted gross income 
exceeds the highest level specified in the 
table, an appropriate and just child support 
amount may be ordered, but the amount ordered 
may not be less than the highest level 
specified in the table for the number of 
children due support. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Brief of Appellant provides an adequate statement 
of the case. 
STATEMENT OP THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
With the exception of the following additional facts, 
the Brief of Appellant provides an adequate statement of the 
facts. 
Defendant testified that her monthly expenses are 
$4,800.00 per month, excluding her car payment which is $396.00, 
for a total of $5,196.00 per month. (FOF, p.3, 18, index 88) 
Defendant testified that those expenses include the expenses 
attendant to herself, her two children, and the two grandchildren 
residing in her home. (FOF, p.3, 18, index 88) The trial court 
found that the expenses related to the two grandchildren are not 
relevant to, nor should they be considered in, the court's award 
of alimony and child support. (FOF, p.3, 18, index 88) 
Defendant offered no evidence at trial as to her needs and 
expenses excluding and independent of the two grandchildren 
residing with her. 
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The trial court determined the assets and liabilities 
of the parties, accumulated and incurred during the marriage and 
outstanding, and made a division thereof, all as provided in 
paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact. (FOF, p.5, Jl3 to p.6, 
index 90-91) 
The trial court found that the obligation set forth in 
subparagraph (r) of paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact, which 
is a loan repayable to plaintiff's parents in the amount of 
$94,389.00 (which does not include any interest), is a marital 
debt of the parties which must be considered in the division of 
the marital estate and which accordingly reduces the marital net 
worth of the parties to a negative net worth. (FOF, p.6, 1l4, 
index 91) The debt was incurred from time to time commencing in 
1984 and some payments have been made thereon as evidenced by 
Defendant's Exhibit 3. (FOF, p.6, 1l4, to p.7, index 91-92) 
The trial court found that since plaintiff was charged 
with the responsibility for repayment of that debt to plaintiff's 
parents, the division of the marital net worth, as provided for 
in paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact, left plaintiff with a 
negative net worth of $43,637.00, while the assets being awarded 
to defendant have a positive net worth of $17,500.00. (FOF, p.7, 
1l4, index 92) The Court found that imbalance to be necessary 
and equitable because at the time of trial plaintiff was the only 
party who had earnings with which the liabilities of the parties 
could be paid. (FOF, p.7, 1l4, index 92) 
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The trial court found that because of the substantial 
debt of the parties and the resulting negative net worth, the 
parties could not afford to maintain and make the mortgage 
payments on the marital residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way and 
ordered the sale of the same at the earliest possible time. 
(FOF# p.8, 1l7# index 93) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court carefully and fully considered the 
evidence presented at trial concerning the parties' financial 
situation. After doing so, the trial court specifically found 
that the parties cannot afford to maintain and make the mortgage 
payments on the marital residence and ordered it sold at the 
earliest possible time. The trial court found that the parties 
have substantial debt. If plaintiff were to be awarded the 
marital home, plaintiff's equity would be tied up and unavailable 
to pay the marital debts, almost all of which were assigned to 
him. Financial considerations alone are sufficient justification 
to order the sale of a marital home. The record contains ample 
evidence to show that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in ordering the sale of the marital home. 
The child support for two children at the maximum 
income level of $10,000.00 set forth in the statutory child 
support table is $1,400.00 per month. Defendant claims that the 
appropriate child support for the two minor children is $1,750.00 
per month and arrived at that sum by applying fourteen percent 
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(14%) (which is the percentage applied to the $10,000.00 
statutory maximum) to plaintiff's gross monthly income of 
$12,510.00. That approach is flawed because it does not consider 
the fact that as gross income increases, the percentage of income 
required for child support decreases. If the statutory child 
support table were extrapolated, plaintiff's monthly child 
support obligation would be $1,500.00 per month. The trial 
court, however, went further and awarded $1,600.00 per month. 
In awarding child support, the trial court: (i) 
considered defendant's testimony regarding monthly expenses, (ii) 
found that the amount of $1,600.00 included some surplus costs 
for the children, (iii) found that plaintiff's gross income was 
$150,120.00, and (iv) found that plaintiff was not employed. In 
doing so, the trial court acted consistently with statutory 
requirements. Because the trial court acted within statutory law 
and made appropriate findings, the trial court did not err in 
setting child support at $1,600.00 per month. Further, the 
record contains ample evidence to show that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in establishing that level of child 
support. 
In awarding alimony, the trial court expressly 
considered (i) the financial conditions and needs of the wife, 
(ii) the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for 
herself, and (iii) the ability of the husband to provide support. 
Further, the trial court made- detailed findings of fact on each 
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factor. After considering all the relevant evidence, the trial 
court awarded defendant $3#000.00 per month after tax income 
($1,400.00 in alimony and $1#600.00 per month in child support) 
and left plaintiff with after tax. spendable income of $2,884.00 
per month. This division has to the extent possible equalized 
the parties' respective standards of living. Accordingly, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in the award of alimony. 
Because plaintiff does not have a common law or 
statutory duty to support the minor grandchildren, plaintiff 
should not be required to do so, whether the support is labeled 
as "child support" or "alimony." As such, the trial court did 
not err by not considering those expenses in awarding child 
support and alimony. 
Because defendant received substantially more than one-
half (#) of the parties' net worth, defendant's assertion that 
the trial court abused its discretion and treated her unfairly is 
totally without merit. 
The record contains substantial evidence to support the 
trial court's determination that the parties have a liability to 
plaintiff's parents in the amount of $94,389.00. That evidence 
is legally sufficient to support the trial court's factual 
determination regarding the existence of that marital liability 
to plaintiff's parents. The trial court's determination 
regarding this debt is not clearly erroneous because it is not 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
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Defendant's complaint that the trial court made no 
order relating to the maintenance of the debt to plaintiff's 
parents is without merit. The trial court assigned this debt to 
plaintiff and ordered him to save and hold defendant harmless 
therefrom. 
In the event that plaintiff substantially prevails on 
appeal, the Court should award plaintiff his attorneys' fees and 
costs on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT It THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION OR ERR IN ORDERING THE 
SALE OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE. 
Defendant asks this court to award the use and 
possession of the marital residence to defendant until the 
children attain their majority or until defendant's remarriage or 
cohabitation. In part, defendant justifies this request by 
arguing that there are sufficient funds to pay the mortgage 
obligation. Defendant is wrong. 
In its Findings of Fact, the trial court specifically 
found: 
1. Plaintiff is employed (FOF, p.2, 16, index 87). 
2. Defendant is unemployed (FOF, p.3, 17, index 88). 
3. The parties have negative net worth (FOF, p.6, 1l4, 
index 91). 
4. The parties have substantial debt (FOF, p.8, 1l7, 
index 93). 
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Because plaintiff is employed, and defendant is not, 
the trial court ordered plaintiff to pay virtually all of the 
marital debts. Specifically, the Decree of Divorce, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Appendix A, orders plaintiff to "pay 
and discharge the following . . . debts and obligations and 
shall save and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom: 
a. K-plus loan no. 1 owing to 
Pacific Power (1,762.00) 
b. K-plus loan no. 2 owing to 
Pacific Power (926.00) 
c. Loan payable to Mr. and Mrs. 
Paul Baker (94,389.00) 
d. Loan payable to Pacific Power (6,700.00) 
e. * Payable to Dr. Hicks (560.00) 
f. Payable to Olivette Furniture (2,000.00) 
g. Plaintiff's attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in this action 
h. Payable to Defendant's attorney 
in this action to apply upon 
attorney's fees and costs incurred 
by the Defendant in this action (2,500.00) 
i. The Plaintiff shall pay and 
discharge all debts and liabilities 
incurred by him since the sepa-
ration of the parties in May, 
1991, and not otherwise provided 
for herein and he shall save and 
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom." 
(DOD, p.9, 1l5 to p.10, index 104-05) The Decree of Divorce also 
awarded plaintiff (i) the marital residence subject to the 
$143,000.00 mortgage thereon (except as otherwise provided) (DOD, 
p.6, 19 to p.7, index 102), (ii) a 1991 GMC subject to the debt 
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thereon in the approximate amount of $19,000.00 (DOD, p.8, Jl4, 
index 103), and (iii) a 1989 Ford Bronco subject to the debt 
thereon in the approximate amount of $10,800.00 (DOD, p.8, 1l4, 
index 103). Further, the Decree orders plaintiff to pay to 
defendant child support in the amount of $1,600.00 per month 
(DOD, p3, 13, index 98) and alimony in the sum of $1,400.00 per 
month (DOD, p.4, ^ 5, index 99). As is evident from the 
foregoing, plaintiff has substantial monthly obligations. 
Plaintiff's monthly cash flow is set forth in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Appendix B. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 shows that the net monthly 
cash available to plaintiff is $2,834.00. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 
also shows that the net monthly cash available to defendant is 
$3,000.00 (alimony at $1,400.00 per month and child support at 
$1,600.00 per month). Thus, the total net monthly cash flow 
available to the parties is $5,834.00. 
The Brief of Appellant ("Defendant's Brief") claims 
that defendant's monthly living expenses are $5,270.00. Id. at 
p. 23. This amount includes the support of the two grandchildren 
living with defendant. If all of defendant's claimed expenses 
were to be met, defendant would require all but $564.00 of the 
parties' total net monthly cash flow. As such, it is clear that 
there are not sufficient funds available to pay the monthly 
mortgage payment of $1,665.00 per month. 
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The trial court carefully and fully considered the 
evidence presented at trial concerning the parties' financial 
situation. After doing so, the trial court stated from the 
bench: "I CANNOT SEE HOW THE PARTIES CAN CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THE 
RESIDENCE WITHOUT LISTING IT IMMEDIATELY FOR SALE." (TR, p.115, 
11.13-15) Subsequently, in its written Findings of Fact (a copy 
of which is attached hereto as Appendix C) the trial court 
specifically found: 
"Because of the substantial debt of the parties and the 
resulting negative net worth, the parties cannot afford 
to maintain and make the mortgage payments on the 
[marital residence! and the same must be sold at the 
earliest possible time." 
(FOF, p.8, 1l7, index 93; emphasis added.) 
The evidence in the record, as set forth in part above, 
plainly supports the trial court's conclusion that the marital 
home must be sold. As such, defendant has not met her burden of 
showing that the trial court's order in this regard was clearly 
erroneous. 
Defendant also asserts that she should be awarded the 
marital home because it would be in the best interest of the 
minor children. In support of this position, defendant cites 
Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593 (Utah App. 1988). In that 
case, the parties were divorced after five years of marriage, 
during which they had two children. Marital assets were meager. 
The principal asset was a three-bedroom house, located on ten and 
one-half acres, in which the family had lived during the 
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marriage. The home had been in the husband's family for two 
generations. The wife was on public assistance, had limited job 
experience and was unlikely to earn more than minimum wage. 
After considering the various circumstances of the 
case, the Peterson court held: 
In the present case, the only resource 
available to support the children is the 
family home. It makes no sense for plaintiff 
and the children to become public charges 
while defendant retains title to and 
possession of the family home for his own 
purposes. . . . 
Further, allowing the children to remain 
in the family home would serve their 
emotional best interests by maintaining their 
roots and security and, thus, helping to 
ameliorate the trauma of the divorce. 
Therefore, in light of the total 
circumstances. we award the exclusive 
occupancy of the house to plaintiff until she 
remarries or until the children reach their 
majority, marry, or otherwise become 
independent of plaintiff. 
(748 P.2d at 595-96; emphasis added.) 
The following facts distinguish the case at hand from 
Peterson: 
1. There is no evidence that the marital residence 
has been in the family for generations affording the children 
with a sense of roots. 
2. Defendant is not on public assistance and will 
earn more than minimum wage. In fact, defendant is a trained and 
qualified teacher in good health and, while uncertified, can re-
certify upon completion of three (3) academic hours of training. 
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Defendant has worked during most of the majority of the marriage 
as a teacher or secretary. (FOF, p.3, 17, index 88) 
3. The marital residence is not the only resource 
available to support the children. Because defendant is 
receiving a total of $3,000.00 per month in combined child 
support and alimony, there are clearly resources to provide 
suitable housing for the children. 
4. The parties have lived in the home for less than 
two years. The home is two or three times the size of the 
parties' former home (TR, p.70, 1.24 to p.71, 1.1), and is valued 
$100,000.00 more than the parties' prior home. (TR, p.70, 1.16; 
TR, p.114, 11.7-8) 
5. The trial court in the instant case found 
defendant's testimony regarding the marital residence confusing: 
JUDGE YOUNG: YOU KNOW, THE INTERESTING THING 
THAT I RECALL ABOUT THE TESTIMONY OF [DEFENDANT] IN 
RELATION TO THAT HOME IS SHE NOW COMES FORWARD AND SAYS 
SHE WANTS THE HOME. AT THE TIME THAT SHE MOVED TO 
SOUTH JORDAN, AS I RECALL HER TESTIMONY, SHE DID NOT 
WANT TO MOVE TO SOUTH JORDAN. IF SHE HAD HER CHOICE 
SHE STATED SHE WOULD LIVE ON THE EAST SIDE WITH A 
SWIMMING POOL, BUT NOW SHE WANTS COUNTRY LIVING. WHAT 
AM I TO CONCLUDE IS HER REAL DESIRE? IT SEEMS TO ME 
THAT THE TESTIMONY IN RELATION TO THE HOME IS BEING 
ADJUSTED BY ITS ECONOMIC IMPACT. I CAN'T SEE WHY SHE 
DOESN'T WANT TO SELL THAT HOME THAT BEARS A $143,000.00 
MORTGAGE THAT HAS BEEN A HOME THAT IS FAR IN EXCESS OF 
WHAT THE PARTIES CAN EFFECTIVELY AFFORD, PARTICULARLY 
UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF DIVORCE, BUT NOW SHE 
WANTS TO TELL ME THAT SHE WANTS TO KEEP THE HOME 
BECAUSE SHE AND THE GRANDCHILDREN AND THE.CHILDREN, TWO 
CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN, RESIDE IN THE HOME, BUT 
THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT THE HOME AND SHE'D RATHER LIVE ON 
THE EAST SIDE WITH A SWIMMING POOL. TO ME, THE 
TESTIMONY BECOMES SOMEWHAT CONFUSING. 
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(TR, p.105, 1.20 to p.106, 1.13; emphasis added) 
6. The trial court in the instant case specifically 
found that the parties cannot afford to maintain and make the 
mortgage payments on the marital residence and that it must be 
sold at the earliest possible time. (FOF, p.8, 1l7, index 93) 
Due to the foregoing circumstances, it is plain that 
Peterson does not control the case at issue. The above facts 
clearly support the trial court's order that the marital 
residence be sold. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
The court should note that financial considerations 
alone are sufficient justification to order sale of a marital 
home. In Blackman v. Blackman. 517 N.Y.S.2d 167 (A.D. 2 Dept. 
1987) the trial court ordered the sale of the marital residence 
in order to provide for the spouses' future living expenses and 
to pay marital debts. The appellate court affirmed, stating: 
Even though exclusive possession of the 
marital residence is usually granted to the 
spouse who has custody of the minor children 
of the marriage . . . , this need of the 
custodial parent to occupy the marital 
residence is weighed against the financial 
need of the parties for a quick sale of the 
marital residence. 
Id. at 170 (citations omitted). The appellate court noted the 
evidence supported the trial court's finding that the spouses' 
salaries were insufficient for their living expenses and that the 
marital residence was a source of funds to meet these expenses 
and satisfy marital debts. 
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Similarly, the trial court in this case stated that 
11
 [b] ecause of the substantial debt of the parties and the 
resulting negative net worth, the parties cannot afford to 
maintain and make the payments on the [marital residence] and the 
same must be sold at the earliest possible time. (FOF, p.8, 117, 
index 93) This finding makes clear the parties do not have the 
funds to make the mortgage payments. Additionally, if defendant 
were to be awarded the marital home, plaintiff's equity would be 
"tied up forever." (TR, p.96, 1.9) That would be inappropriate 
considering the fact that plaintiff has the responsibility to 
discharge essentially all of the marital debts. Plaintiff is 
obviously in need of funds to satisfy those debts. 
At bottom, the record contains ample evidence to show 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the 
sale of the marital home. Accordingly, defendant has failed to 
establish that the trial court's factual determination in this 
connection was clearly erroneous, that is, that the trial court's 
finding is in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence or 
creates a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made. 
POINT lis THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN THE DIVISION OF THE 
MORTGAGE PAYMENTS PENDING SALE OF 
THE MARITAL RESIDENCE. 
After some discussion regarding the amount of the 
mortgage payment, the trial court ruled: 
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JUDGE YOUNG: WHATEVER [THE MORTGAGE 
PAYMENT] IS I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT THE 
we- DEFENDANT PAY $1,000.00 TOWARDS IT AND THE 
PLAINTIFF PAY THE REMAINDER UNTIL THE HOME IS 
SOLD. SO THAT WAY IT GIVES THE DEFENDANT 
SOME RELIEF ON THE MORTGAGE PAYMENT. 
NOW/ THAT WILL GO ON FROM APRIL 1ST 
THROUGH SEPTEMBER, THROUGH THE SEPTEMBER 
PAYMENT. THEREFORE, THEREAFTER THE DEFENDANT 
SHALL BE OBLIGATED TO BEAR THAT PAYMENT. SO 
I'M ANTICIPATING THAT THE HOME--I WANT THE 
PARTIES TO BE MOTIVATED TO SELL THE HOME SO 
THAT THEY CAN GET RID OF THAT HORRENDOUS 
LIABILITY. 
NOW, THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THE ALIMONY 
FIGURE THAT--WELL, PENDING THE SALE OF THE 
HOME THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE OBLIGATED TO PAY-
MR. COWLEY: PLAINTIFF. 
JUDGE YOUNG: EXCUSE ME, PLAINTIFF. 
YES. THANK YOU. PLAINTIFF SHALL BE 
OBLIGATED TO PAY $1,200.00 IN ALIMONY. AT 
THE SALE OF THE HOME THE ALIMONY SHALL 
CONTINUE AND SHALL REMAIN AS A PERMANENT 
AWARD OF ALIMONY IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,400.00 A 
MONTH. 
(TR, p.116, 1.12 to p.114, 1.6; emphasis added) 
Defendant's Brief argues that (i) there was no evidence 
"that the defendant would obstruct or prevent the sale of the 
marital residence, warranting the trial court's order that the 
defendant should bear the entire mortgage payment if the home did 
not sell by October 1, 1992," and (ii) "the court order serves as 
a punishment of the defendant, rather than a motivation." 
(Defendant's Brief, p.21) Defendant is mistaken. 
The trial court recognized that the "horrendous 
liability" (TR, p.116, 1.22) associated with the marital home 
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must be eliminated as soon as possible. The trial court ordered 
a mortgage payment allocation which was designed to motivate the 
parties to sell the home. Defendant claims that there was no 
evidence that defendant would obstruct or prevent the sale of the 
marital home. History has demonstrated the court's wisdom in 
this matter because it is now apparent, as reflected in a 
collateral proceeding in this case, that defendant intends to and 
in fact has prevented the sale of the marital home.1 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE 
DEFENDANT CHILD SUPPORT AT THE 
LEVEL OF ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($1,600.00) PER MONTH. 
Defendant argues that the trial court's award of child 
support in the amount of $1,600.00 per month is "simply too low." 
Defendant's Brief, p.26. Defendant also asserts that the trial 
court's findings are inadequate. 
In large part, defendant's analysis relies upon Allred 
v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108 (Utah App. 1990). Defendant, however, 
fails to note that Allred predates the statutory guidelines now 
in effect. At the time of the dispute in Allred. §78-45-7(2) 
Utah Code Ann. (1987) required trial courts to consider all 
\As the Court is aware, on Tuesday, September 15, 1992, 
defendant's Motion to Stay the portions of the trial court judgment 
awarding the marital residence to plaintiff and ordering the 
immediate sale thereof came on for hearing before the Court of 
Appeals. A potential buyer had made an offer to purchase the 
marital home. The Court of Appeals granted defendant's Motion to 
Stay. 
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relevant factors in determining child support, including but not 
limited to the following: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of 
the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. 
Allred, supra. at ill. In 1987 it was proper to require trial 
courts to consider the above factors because the 1987 Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act (a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Appendix D) did not contain a child support table. 
The Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act has been 
amended since Allred. Section 78-45-7 Utah Code Ann, now 
provides in part: 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or 
a material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court determining the amount of 
prospective support shall require each party 
to file a proposed award of child support 
using the guidelines before an order awarding 
child support or modifying an existing award 
may be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient 
evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considering all 
relevant factors, including but not limited 
to: 
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(a) the standard of living 
and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and 
income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the 
obligor to earji; 
(d) the ability of the 
obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, 
the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; 
and 
(g) the responsibilities of 
the obligor and the obligee for the 
support of others. 
Thus, it is clear that the factors listed in §78-45-7(3) only 
apply if the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the 
guidelines. Rebuttal is discussed in §78-45-7.2(3): 
A written finding or specific finding on 
the record supporting the conclusion that 
complying with a provision of the guidelines 
or ordering an award amount resulting from 
use of the guidelines would be unjust, 
inappropriate, or not in the best interest of 
a child in a particular case is sufficient to 
rebut the presumption in that case. 
The case at hand does not involve a situation where rebutting the 
guidelines is at issue. Therefore, the factors listed in §78-45-
7(3) are not applicable to this case. 
The statute at issue in this case is §78-45-7.12, which 
provides: 
If the combined adjusted gross income 
exceeds the highest level specified in the 
table, an appropriate and just child support 
amount may be ordered, but the amount ordered 
may not be less than the highest level 
specified in the table for the number of 
children due support. 
g:\wpc\185\00001iri.W51 - 1 8 -
Defendant, in effect, argues that if the combined adjusted gross 
income exceeds the highest level specified in the table, the 
court must consider the factors contained in §78-45-7(3). 
Section §78-45-7.12 does not say that. If the legislature had 
intended that the factors contained in §78-45-7(3) are to be 
applied when gross income exceeds the highest level in the table, 
the legislature would have said so. All that the legislature in 
fact required is that "an appropriate and just child support 
amount may be ordered, but the amount ordered may not be less 
than the highest level specified in the table for the number of 
children due support." That is exactly what the trial court did 
in this case after considering the evidence at trial. 
Defendant gave the following testimony at trial: 
Q (BY MS. WILLIAMS) MRS. BAKER, HAVE YOU 
HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE UNIFORM 
CHILD CUSTODY GUIDELINES AND THE CHILD 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION? 
A YES. 
Q AND YOU'RE AWARE THAT THE AMOUNT OF 
INCOME MADE BY MR. BAKER IS IN EXCESS OF 
$10,000.00 AND, THEREFORE, NOT ON THE CHILD 
SUPPORT SCHEDULE. 
A YES. 
Q BASED UPON THE GUIDELINES AT THE TOP 
FIGURE OF 1,400, WHICH IS 14 PERCENT OF 
$10,000.00, WOULD IT BE YOUR DESIRE THAT THAT 
SAME 14 PERCENT FIGURE BE USED TO COMPUTE THE 
CHILD SUPPORT IN THIS MATTER? 
A YES. 
Q AND WHAT IS THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT 
THEN THAT YOU BELIEVE IS APPROPRIATE? 
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A 1,750 A MONTH. 
Q AND ARE YOUR EXPENSES--ARE YOUR EXPENSES 
SUCH THAT THAT 1,750 WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR 
THE CARE OF YOUR CHILDREN? 
A YES, UM, YES. 
(TR, p.84, 1.8 to p.85, 1. 2) 
It is clear from the foregoing that defendant arrived 
at the sum of $1,750.00 by applying fourteen percent (14%) (which 
is the percentage applied to the $10,000.00 maximum income in the 
statutory table) to plaintiff's gross monthly income of 
$12,510.00. The flaw with that approach is that it does not 
consider that fact that as gross income increases, the percentage 
of income required for child support decreases. The following 
income and child support levels from the statutory table are 
illustrative (child support ie for two children): 
Child Support as 
a Percentage 
Gross Income of Income Child Support 
$ 7,500 16% $1,205 
10,000 14 1,400 
If this table were extrapolated so as to apply the same two 
percent (2%) decrease to an income increase of $2,500.00, the 
resulting child support would be as follows: 
Child Support as 
a Percentage 
Gross Income of Income Child Support 
$12,500 12% $1,500 
Under this extrapolation approach, plaintiff's monthly child 
support obligation would be $1,500.00 per month because his gross 
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monthly income is $12,510 per month. The trial court, however, 
went further and awarded $1,600-00 per month. 
Defendant complains that the trial court did not make 
adequate findings to support defendant's child support award. 
Defendant is wrong. At trial plaintiff suggested that he pay 
$1,600.00 per month in child support. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. 
The trial court specifically found that amount included some 
surplus: 
JUDGE YOUNG: EIGHT AND NINE THIS YEAR. 
AND THE TOTAL COST--THEY HAVE OFFERED 
$1,600.00 A MONTH, PLUS OR MINUS A FEW 
DOLLARS. I THINK IT WAS A LITTLE BIT OVER. 
BUT THE CHILDREN DON'T COST $800.00 A MONTH 
FOR FOOD, CLOTHING AND SHELTER. SO THERE'S 
GOT TO BE SOME SURPLUS IN THAT. 
(TR, p.109, 11.3-8) Additionally, the Findings of Fact provide: 
8. The Defendant testified that her monthly 
expenses are $4,800.00 per month, excluding 
her car payment which is $396.00, for a total 
of $5,196.00 per month. The Defendant 
testified that those expenses include the 
expenses attendant to herself, her two 
children, and the two grandchildren residing 
in her home. The expenses related to the two 
grandchildren are not relevant to, nor should 
they be considered in, the Court's award of 
alimony and child support. 
9. Premised and predicated upon the total 
gross compensation of the Plaintiff 
(including bonuses and car allowance) of 
$150,120.00 and further premised and 
predicated upon the fact that the Defendant 
is currently unemployed and currently has no 
income, reasonable child support to be paid 
by Plaintiff to Defendant for the benefit of 
the two (2) children is $1,600.00 per month. 
The income level of the Plaintiff exceeds the 
guideline amounts set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
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§78-45-1 and the Court finds $1,600.00 to be 
a reasonable sum. 
(FOF, p.3, 18 to p.4, 19, index 88-89) 
In doing so, the trial court acted consistently with statutory 
requirements. 
Thus, it is clear that in awarding child support the 
trial court: (i) considered defendant's testimony regarding 
monthly expenses, (.ii) found that the amount of $1,600.00 
included some surplus costs for the children, (iii) found that 
plaintiff's gross income was $150,120.00, and (iv) found that 
plaintiff was not employed. The trial court specifically stated 
that lf[t]he income level of the Plaintiff exceeds the guideline 
amounts set Eorth in Utah Code Ann. §78-45-1 and the Court finds 
$1,600.00 to be a reasonable pum." (FOF, p.4, 59, index 89) 
That is wholly consistent with the mandate set forth in §78-45-
7.12. 
Because the trial court acted in full compliance with 
§78-45-7.12 and made appropriate findings, the trial court did 
not err in setting child support at $1,600.00 per month. 
Further, as indicated above, the record contains ample evidence 
to show that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
establishing that level of child support. Accordingly, defendant 
has failed to establish that the trial court's factual 
determination regarding the award of child support was clearly 
erroneous. 
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POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN AWARDING THE DEFENDANT ALIMONY AT THE 
LEVEL OF ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($1,400.00) PER MONTH. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE ADEQUATE 
TO SUPPORT THE ALIMONY AWARD AND THE ALIMONY 
AWARD IS ADEQUATE. 
The trial court awarded defendant the sum of One 
Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($1,400.00) per month as and for 
alimony. (DOD, p.4, 15, index 99) Defendant claims that 
$1,400.00 per month is inadequate and that the trial court's 
findings of fact are inadequate. Defendant is mistaken on both 
counts. 
In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), the 
Supreme Court of Utah stated that the criteria to be "considered 
in determining a reasonable award for support and maintenance 
include the financial conditions and needs of the wife, the 
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself, 
and the ability of the husband to provide support." Id. at 411-
12. The three factors articulated in English must be considered 
in fixing a reasonable alimony award. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). Further, "[t]he trial court must make 
sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to enable a 
reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's discretionary 
determination was rationally based upon these three factors." 
Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah App. 1991). Finally, "[a]n 
alimony award should . . . to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a 
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level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage." Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, (Utah 
1988) . As explained below, the trial court followed the mandates 
of English. Jones. Bell and Gardner. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact state in part: 
6. The Plaintiff is employed and his 
current annual gross compensation, including 
car allowance and anticipated bonuses, is 
$150,120,00. The Plaintiff has been the 
primary wage earner during the marriage. The 
parties' incomes for the previous years, 
including bonuses and relocation 
reimbursement, are as follows: 1990 -
$169,248; 1989 - $120,434; 1988 - $111,715; 
1987 - $92,674; 1986 - $76,149. 
7. The Defendant is an educated, trained 
and qualified teacher in the Utah public 
school system and she is in good health. She 
last worked and last taught a full contract 
year for the school year 1989-1990. She has 
worked during the majority of the parties' 
marriage as a school teacher or secretary. 
She is currently uncertified, but can 
recertify upon completion of three (3) 
academic hours of training which she can 
readily obtain between now and the beginning 
of the 1992-1993 school year. The Defendant 
is currently unemployed and presently has no 
income. 
8. The Defendant testified that her monthly 
expenses are $4,800.00 per month, excluding 
her car payment which is $396.00, for a total 
of $5,196.00 per month. The Defendant 
testified that those expenses include the 
expenses attendant to herself, her two 
children, and the two grandchildren residing 
in her home. The expenses related to the two 
grandchildren are not relevant to, nor should 
they be considered in, the Court's award of 
alimony and child support. 
9. Premised and predicated upon the total 
gross compensation of the Plaintiff 
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(including bonuses and car allowance) of 
$150,120.00 and further premised and 
predicated upon the fact that the Defendant 
is currently unemployed and currently has no 
income, reasonable child support to be paid 
by Plaintiff to Defendant for the benefit of 
the two (2) children is $1,600.00 per month. 
The income level of the Plaintiff exceeds the 
guideline amounts set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-1 and the Court finds $1,600.00 to be 
a reasonable sum. Given the Plaintiff's 
current income and the fact that the 
Defendant is not currently employed and is 
without income and given the debts and 
expenses of the parties, most of which must 
be paid by the Plaintiff and given the needs 
of the Plaintiff and the Defendant, 
reasonable alimony to be paid by the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant is $1,400.00 per 
month. 
(FOF, p.2, 16 to p.4, 19) 
The above Findings of Fact make it abundantly clear 
that the trial court in awarding alimony expressly considered (i) 
the financial conditions and needs of the wife, (ii) the ability 
of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself, and (iii) 
the ability of the husband to provide support. It should be 
noted that even though defendant did not present any evidence at 
trial concerning her needs, the trial court expressly considered 
defendant's testimony that she, the two minor children and the 
two grandchildren have total monthly expenses of $5,196.00. 
The above Findings of Fact also plainly show that the trial court 
made sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to 
enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's 
discretionary determination was rationally based upon those three 
factors. The only remaining question, then, is whether the trial 
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court equalized the parties' respective standards of living to 
the extent possible. 
Defendant's argument regarding the parties' respective 
post-divorce incomes does not take into account all of the 
evidence presented at trial. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, on the other 
hand, sets forth a .complete cash flow analysis of plaintiff's 
earnings. That Exhibit begins with plaintiff's gross income and 
then subtracts therefrom PICA, various withholdings, the debts 
assigned to plaintiff, child support, alimony, and state and 
federal taxes: 
Annual 
Plaintiff's current gross annual income 
Includes car allowance of $7,800 and 
average bonus $150,120.00 
Less FICA withheld (5,115.00) 
Withholding for health and accident insurance (468.00) 
Withholding for accidental death (210.00) 
Withholding for dental insurance (192.00) 
Withholding for life insurance (821.00) 
Withholding for vision insurance (120.00) 
Car payment on GMC at $452.00 per month (5,424.00) 
Car payment on Bronco at $264.00 per month (3,168.00) 
Monthly payment to Olivette Furniture - $200.00 (2,400.00) 
Repayment of K-plus no. 1 loan @ $135.00 per month (1,620.00) 
Repayment of K-plus no. 2 loan @ $57.00 per month (684.00) 
Pay Dr. Hicks at $25.00 per month (300.00) 
Payment to Paul Baker at $750.00 per month (12,000.00) 
Pay Pacific Power at $400.00 per month (4,800.00) 
Child support for two children at $1,600.00 
per month (19,284.00) 
Balance available for tax and support of the parties $ 93,514.00 
Suggested alimony for Mrs. Baker at $1,400.00 
per month (16,800.00) 
Federal and state taxes payable by Mr. Baker 
calculated as follows: 
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Gross income $150,120.00 
Less alimony (16,800.00) 
Less 2 personal exemptions 
and itemized deductions (5.000.00) 
Taxable income $128,320.00 
Federal and state tax at 
combined estimated rate x.33 
Federal & state income tax ($42.345.00) 
Net annual cash available for Mr. Baker $34,009.00 
Net monthly cash available for Mr. Baker $2,834.00 
The net result is that even though plaintiff's gross monthly 
income is $12,510.00, after plaintiff meets all of the above 
monthly obligations, plaintiff has only $2,834.00 per month to 
meet his expenses and defendant has $3,000.00 per month to meet 
her expenses. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 also shows defendant's cash flow: 
Month Annual 
Net cash for Mrs. Baker and children 
Child support $1,600.00 $19,284.00 
Alimony 1.400.00 16.800.00 
$3.000.00 $36.084.00 
With alimony and child support at this level 
and with Mrs. Baker filing as head of 
household and taking the children as 
exemptions, she will not incur Federal or 
State income tax liabilities. 
Accordingly, defendant has $3,000.00 per month to meet the needs 
of herself and the two children. This is more than one-half (&) 
of the parties' monthly cash flow. 
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Apparently, defendant now takes the position that only 
alimony, and not child support, should be taken into account when 
the trial court is equalizing the parties' respective standards 
of living. That is not what defendant's counsel maintained at 
trial. At trial, defendant's counsel argued as follows: 
AND I THINK THE COURT HAS TO LOOK AT THE 
RELATIVE EARNINGS REGARDLESS OF THE FACT THAT 
SHE CAN AND WILL AND WANTS TO GO OUT AND 
WORK, BUT THE COURT NEEDS TO LOOK AT WHAT'S 
GOING TO HAPPEN AFTERWARDS AND THE FACT THAT 
WHEN SHE'S AWARDED CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 
THAT IT SHOULD BE A REASONABLE AMOUNT AND 
THAT IT SHOULD EQUALIZE THOSE PARTIES' 
INCOMES. THANK YOU. 
(TR, p.110, 11.17-23; emphasis added) Defendant was correct in 
this assertion. It is reasonable and proper for the trial court 
to take into account both alimony and child support in equalizing 
the parties' incomes. This is entirely consistent with the 
directive that the trial court should to the extent possible 
"equalize the parties' respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possible to that standard 
enjoyed during the marriage." Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 
1081 (Utah 1988). 
In the instant case, the trial court considered all the 
evidence at trial and then equitably divided plaintiff's income 
between the parties. The division allocates $2,834.00 per month 
to plaintiff and $3,000.00 per month to defendant ($1,400.00 in 
alimony and $1,600.00 per month in child support). The fact that 
defendant was awarded more than half of the cash flow was 
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appropriate given that defendant has custody of the two children. 
This division has to the extent possible equalized the parties' 
respective standards of living and maintained them at a level as 
close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in the award of alimony. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT 
CONSIDERING THE EXPENSES ATTENDANT TO THE 
GRANDCHILDREN. 
At trial plaintiff testified that the parties' 
granddaughter, Lacey, had been living with the parties for 
approximately five years, and that Lacey's mother had also lived 
with the parties for three or four years during that time. (TR, 
p.43, 11.19-21; p.44, 12-18) The parties' grandson, Christopher, 
had lived with the parties for about one month while the parties 
were living together. (TR, p.46, 11.10-13) Plaintiff testified 
that he did not request that defendant stay at home and take care 
of the grandchildren. (TR, p.45, 1.25 to p.46, 1.9) Plaintiff 
also testified that he did not encourage Christopher moving into 
the marital home, and, that due to emotional problems that the 
grandchildren and their mother may suffer, plaintiff would like 
to see both of the grandchildren go back with their mother. (TR, 
p.46, 1.25 to p.47,- 1.12) 
Plaintiff's counsel objected to defendant's testimony 
regarding the grandchildren on the grounds of irrelevancy and 
immateriality. (TR, p.62, 11.12-15) The trial court sustained 
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that objection. (TR, p.63, 11.5-6) Defendant's counsel made a 
proffer of defendant's testimony regarding the grandchildren. 
(TR, p.89, 1.19 to p. 90, 1.9) 
The trial court found that "[t]he expenses related to 
the two grandchildren are not relevant to, nor should they be 
considered in, the Court's award of alimony and child support." 
(FOF, p.3, 58, index 88) 
Plaintiff does not have a common law or statutory duty 
to provide support for the parties' grandchildren. Parents have 
the duty to support their children. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3 to 
4. 
Defendant "does not contend that the plaintiff owes a 
duty of child support for the grandchildren in defendant's home." 
Defendant's Brief, p.37. Defendant is correct in this 
contention. Defendant, however, attempts to make an end run 
around the fact that plaintiff does not have a duty to support 
the grandchildren. Defendant does so by claiming that expenses 
attendant to the grandchildren should be included in her alimony 
award. As such, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in 
not permitting defendant's testimony relating to the 
grandchildren. Because plaintiff does not have a duty to support 
the minor grandchildren, plaintiff should not be required to do 
so, whether the support is labeled as "child support" or 
"alimony." 
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Because testimony relating to the grandchildren is not 
relevant to this action, the trial court did not err by excluding 
defendant's proffered testimony relating to the grandchildren. 
The Court should note that defendant's proffered testimony did 
not provide information relating to the expenses of the minor 
grandchildren. 
In sum, because the grandchildren's expenses are not 
relevant to this case, the trial court did not err by not 
considering such expenses in awarding child support and alimony. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR OR ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL 
ESTATE. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 contains a statement of the 
parties' assets and liabilities and plaintiff's suggested 
division thereof. (A copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is attached 
hereto as Appendix E.) At trial, plaintiff's counsel made the 
following offer of proof which was accepted by the court: 
LET ME TRY BY WAY OF PROFFER, IF I MAY, TO 
SAVE US ALL SOME TIME, IT WOULD BE MR. 
BAKER'S TESTIMONY THAT PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1, 
WHICH IS ENTITLED STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND 
LIABILITIES, WAS PREPARED UNDER HIS 
SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION AT MY OFFICE, THAT 
IT CONTAINS ALL OF THE ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
OF WHICH HAS ANY KNOWLEDGE AND THAT IT ALSO 
CONTAINS A PROPOSED DIVISION, HIS SUGGESTED 
DIVISION. AND THAT WOULD BE HIS TESTIMONY IF 
I HAD ASKED HIM TO TESTIFY ABOUT THIS 
EXHIBIT. BASED ON THAT PROFFER, IF THAT'S 
ACCEPTABLE TO MS. WILLIAMS, I WOULD OFFER 
EXHIBIT 1. 
(TR, p. 16, 1.18 to p. 17, 1.2) Defendant's counsel had no 
objection and the trial court received Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
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(TR,17, 11.2-7) As such, the trial court had evidence of all of 
the parties' assets and liabilities, and their respective values 
and amounts. 
Defendant also provided a schedule of marital assets 
and her proposed division thereof, which was designated as 
Defendant's Exhibit 7. A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 7 is 
attached hereto as Appendix F. 
Based on the evidence at trial, the trial court made 
the following findings regarding the parties' assets and 
liabilities: 
13. The assets and (liabilities) of the parties 
accumulated and incurred during the marriage and 
currently outstanding and an equitable division thereof 
is as follows: 
No. Description Mrs. Baker Mr. Baker 
(a) Residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way $183,000.00 
(b) Mortgage on residence (143,000.00) 
(c) Household furnishings and 
fixtures at residence $15,000.00 15,000.00 
(d) 2 3/4 acres in Price, Utah 6,000.00 
(e) 1990 Ford Bronco operated 
by Mrs. Baker 17,000.00 
(f) Purchase debt on 1990 Ford Bronco (14,500.00) 
(g) 1991 GMC operated by Mr. Baker 18,000.00 
(h) Purchase debt on 1991 GMC (19,000.00) 
(i) 1989 Ford Bronco 12,000.00 
(j) Purchase debt on 1989 Bronco (10,800.00) 
(k) Horse - 2 year filly 2,000.00 
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(1) Horse - D.B. Cooper 1,500.00 
(ni) Garden, power & hand tools 2,000.00 
(n) Tack for horses 400.00 
(o) U.S. Savings Bonds 600.00 
(p) K-plus loan no. 1 owing to 
Pacific Power (1,762.00) 
(q) K-plus loan no. 2 owing to 
Pacific Power (926.00) 
(r) Loan payable to Plaintiff's parents (94,389.00) 
(s> Loan payable to Pacific Power (6,700.00) 
(t) Payable to Dr. Hicks (560.00) 
(u) Payable to Olivette Furniture (2,000.00) 
(v) Estimated attorney's fees for 
Mr. Baker (2,500.00) 
(w) Estimated attorney's fees for 
Mrs. Baker (2,500.00) 
(x) Clothing and personal effects 
each party - not valued - NV NV 
NET VALUES 517.500.00 5(43.637.00) 
(y) Together with an equal division between the parties of all 
401K, pension and retirement funcis of both parties per 
appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations and other 
necessary orders. 
(FOF, b.5 113 to p.6, index 90-91) As is evident from the above 
findincjS# the trial court gave careful Qonsideration to all of 
the parties' assets and liabilities. 
In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah App. 1990), 
the coiirt held that, absent special circumstances, each party is 
entitled to fifty percent of the marital property. As is readily 
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apparent from the above "equitable division,n the parties have a 
negative net worth. Thus, under Dunn, each party should have 
been awarded one-half (#) of the parties' negative net worth. 
That, however, was not done. According to the division of the 
marital net worth, as reflected in 1l3 quoted above, plaintiff 
was left with a negative net worth of $43,637.00, while defendant 
was awarded assets such that she had a positive net worth of 
$17,500.00. From plaintiff's perspective, this division of net 
worth falls short of the equal division called for in Dunn. Yet 
it is not plaintiff who is complaining; defendant is. Because 
defendant received substantially more than one-half (%) of the 
parties' net worth, defendant's assertions that the trial court 
abused its discretion and treated her unfairly are totally 
without merit. 
It appears that defendant's major complaint with 
respect to the property division concerns the parties' loan 
payable to plaintiff's parents in the amount of $94,389.00. 
Apparently, defendant believes that the trial court erred in 
finding that this obligation is a marital liability. The 
evidence presented at trial, however, clearly shows that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this finding: 
1. Exhibit 1 clearly lists this obligation as a 
marital liability. 
2. Plaintiff's testimony on this subject can be found 
in the trial transcript at the following pages: 
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TR, p . 2 1 , 1 1 . 2 - 2 1 : 
Q (BY MR. COWLEY) NOW, ON PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 1, MR. BAKER, I NOTICE A LINE NUMBER 
18 SAYS LOAN PAYABLE TO YOUR PARENTS, 
$ 9 4 , 3 8 9 . 0 0 . 
A YES, SIR. 
Q AND IN FACT, YOU AND MRS. BAKER OWE THAT 
TO YOUR MOTHER AND DAD. 
A YES, WE DO. AND MY MOTHER AND DAD WANT 
IT. 
Q THEY'VE ASKED FOR IT? 
A YES. 
Q AND THAT'S MONEY THAT THEY ADVANCED TO 
YOU AND MRS. BAKER OVER MANY YEARS; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A YES, THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND YOUR FATHER KEPT VERY CLOSE TRACK OF 
IT? 
A VERY CLOSE. 
Q HAS A SCHEDULE? 
A YES. 
Q KEEPS UP WITH IT. IT'S ALSO TRUE THAT 
YOU'VE MADE SOME PAYMENTS ON THAT OVER THE 
YEARS. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. I'VE MADE WHAT PAYMENTS 
I COULD MAKE. 
TR, p . 35 , 1 1 . 8 - 1 6 : 
Q [BY MS. WILLIAMS] MR. BAKER, YOU 
INDICATED THAT YOUR FATHER KEPT A JOURNAL OR 
LEDGER OF PAYMENTS ON THE LOAN THAT YOU 
TESTIFIED TO. DID YOU KEEP A RECORD OF 
PAYMENTS MADE? 
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A YES. 
Q AND I JUST PUT BEFORE YOU, I BELIEVE 
THAT'S DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 3. DOES THAT 
EXHIBIT--CAN YOU TELL ME IF THAT EXHIBIT SETS 
FORTH THE PAYMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE BY YOU 
TO YOUR FATHER? 
A I BELIEVE SO, YES. 
Q AND DOES THAT ACCURATELY REFLECT 
PAYMENTS MADE SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE 
OBLIGATION IN 1984? 
A YES. 
(A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 3 is attached hereto as Appendix 
H.) 
TR, p.36, 11.4-13: 
Q (BY MS. WILLIAMS) MR. BAKER, YOU 
TESTIFIED THAT YOUR WIFE KNEW ABOUT THE FUNDS 
THAT YOU BORROWED FROM YOUR FATHER. 
A YES. 
Q DID SHE KNOW ABOUT EACH TIME YOU 
BORROWED MONEY? 
A YOU MEAN SPECIFIC? 
A AT THAT PARTICULAR MOMENT SHE MAY HAVE 
AND SHE MAY NOT HAVE. THERE WERE TIMES WHEN 
SHE BORROWED THE MONEY FROM MY PARENTS. 
TR, p.38, 1. 19 to p.39, 1.5: 
Q [BY MS. WILLIAMS] YOU MADE NO PAYMENTS 
IN 1990. IS THERE SOME REASON YOU DIDN'T? 
A I HAD EXTREME DEBT. NO MONEY. 
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Q YOU MADE ONE PAYMENT IN '91 AND THAT WAS 
IN DECEMBER OF, JUST RECENTLY, DECEMBER OF 
LAST YEAR; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q IS THERE SOME REASON THAT YOU MADE THAT 
PAYMENT AFTER HAVING NOT MADE A PAYMENT FOR 
SEVERAL YEARS? 
A TWO REASONS. ONE IS I HAD THE MONEY AND 
THE SECOND IS I'M GETTING A LOT OF PRESSURE 
FROM MY PARENTS TO PAY 'EM BACK. MY FATHER'S 
CLOSE TO 72 YEARS OLD. 
TR, p.47, 1.18 to p. 48, 1.15: 
Q [BY MS. WILLIAMS] WHAT WOULD BE YOUR 
INTENTIONS REGARDING PAYING BACK THE AMOUNTS 
THAT YOU SAY ARE OWED TO YOUR DAD? 
A MY INTENTIONS IS TO PAY MY FATHER BACK. 
Q HOW? 
A CASH. AS I'VE DONE IN THE PAST. IF 
THERE'S SOMETHING THAT I CAN TRADE HIM FOR 
CREDIT. THAT TYPE OF THING. I HOPED TO PAY 
HIM AROUND $1,000.00 A MONTH IF I CAN MAKE 
IT. 
Q WELL, YOU MADE ONE PAYMENT IN 1991 SO IS 
THERE A POSSIBILITY YOU'LL ONLY MAKE ONE 
PAYMENT IN '92? 
A WELL, NO. I'M MAKING THE PAYMENTS AS I 
CAN GET THE MONEY. IF I DON'T HAVE ANY MONEY 
I CAN'T PAY HIM. 
Q DO YOU HAVE MORE DEBT NOW THAN YOU HAD 
IN 1984? 
A YES. 
Q IN RELATION TO YOUR INCOME DO YOU HAVE 
MORE DEBT? 
A YES. 
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Q DO YOU THINK YOUR FATHER WOULD BE 
SATISFIED WITH LESS THAN A $1,000.00 A MONTH 
PAYMENT? 
A THERE'S A POTENTIAL. BUT AS I MENTIONED 
EARLIER, MY FATHER'S RETIRED, HE'S 72 YEARS 
OLD. I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH LONGER MY FATHER 
IS GOING TO BE AROUND. HE LOOKS AT THIS AS A 
COMMITMENT. HE GAVE US THE MONEY AND WE TOLD 
HIM WE'D PAY IT BACK. 
3. The following exchange occurred at trial between 
the trial judge and defendant's counsel: 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. MS. WILLIAMS, DO I 
RECALL CORRECTLY THAT YOU HAVE TAKEN THE 
DEPOSITION OF HIS PARENTS IN THE DISCOVERY 
PORTION OF THIS CASE? 
MS. WILLIAMS: I DID, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AND THAT IT WOULD BE 
THEIR TESTIMONY THAT IF THEY WERE CALLED TO 
TESTIFY THEY WOULD STATE THAT THIS IS AN 
OBLIGATION THAT THEY INTEND TO HAVE RE-PAID? 
MS. WILLIAMS: THAT WAS THEIR TESTIMONY. 
(TR, p. 43, 11.7-14) 
The Court should note that plaintiff's father is 72 
years old and that it will take approximately eight years to 
retire this debt with monthly payments of $1,000.00 per month 
without interest. At that time plaintiff's father will be 
approximately 80 years old. 
Based upon the evidence at trial, the trial court made 
the following findings of fact: 
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14. The obligation set forth in subparagraph (r) of 
paragraph 14 above, which is a loan repayable to the 
Plaintiff's parents- in the amount of $94,389.00 (which 
does not include any interest), is a marital debt of 
the parties which must be considered in the division of 
the marital estate and which accordingly reduces the 
marital net worth of the parties to a negative net 
worth. The debt was incurred from time to time 
commencing in 1984 and some payments have been made 
thereon as evidenced by Defendant's Exhibit 3. Since 
Plaintiff is charged with the responsibility for 
repayment of that debt to Plaintiff's parents, the 
division .of the marital net worth, as provided for in 
paragraph 14 above, leaves the Plaintiff with a 
negative net worth of $43,637.00, while the assets 
being awarded to the Defendant have a positive net 
worth of $17,500.00. The Court finds this imbalance to 
be necessary and equitable because the Plaintiff is the 
only party who has earnings with which the liabilities 
of the parties, as set forth in paragraph 14 above, can 
be paid. 
(FOF, p.6 114 to p.7, index 92) 
The evidence set forth above is legally sufficient to 
support the trial court's factual determination regarding the 
existence of the marital debt to plaintiff's parents. The trial 
court's determination is not clearly erroneous because it is not 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Defendant complains that the trial court made "no order 
relating to the maintenance of [the debt to plaintiff's 
parents]." Defendant's Brief, p.43. Defendant is mistaken. As 
between plaintiff and defendant, the trial court ordered 
plaintiff to pay this debt and save and hold defendant harmless 
therefrom. (DOD, p.9, 1l5, index 104) 
POINT VI: PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS ATTORNEYS1 
FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
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In the event that plaintiff substantially prevails on 
appeal, the Court should award plaintiff his attorneys' fees and 
costs on appeal. (See Lyncrle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1033 
(Utah App. 1992)) stating "Generally, when the trial court awards 
fees in a domestic action to the party who then substantially 
prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on 
appeal." The Court should note that in the instant case, 
attorney's fees were resolved by stipulation in the division of 
the marital estate. (FOF, p.6, 1l3, index 91; TR, p.90, 1.13 to 
p.91, 1.16)) 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant complains that the trial court abused its 
discretion with respect to a number of matters. Rather than 
marshalling the supporting evidence and then demonstrating that 
the evidence is inadequate to sustain the trial court's findings, 
defendant has attempted to retry this case in the Court of 
Appeals by advancing the evidence and arguments supporting her 
position. This Court, however, is not "free to substitute [its] 
judgment for that of the trial court." Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 
P.2d 1027, 1033 (Utah App. 1992). 
The record contains ample evidence to show that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to any 
matter on appeal. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish 
that the trial court's factual determinations were clearly 
erroneous, that is, that the trial court's findings are in 
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conflict with the clear weight of the evidence or create a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. As 
such, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this /U day of September, 1992. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By {^X^M\J^^/ 
James P. Cowley (_.^^ 
Clark K. Taylor 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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g \wpc\185\0OO01in W51 -42-
APPENDICES 
A. Judgement and Decree of Divorce 
B. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 - Plaintiff's Earnings and Plaintiff's 
Suggested Allocation and Utilization Thereof 
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
D. 1987 Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act 
E. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 - Statement of Assets & (Liabilities) 
and Plaintiff's Suggested Division Thereof 
F. Defendant's Exhibit 7 - Schedule of Marital Assets and 
[Defendant's] Proposed Property Distribution 
G. Defendant's Exhibit 3 - Paul Baker Loan Payment History 
g:\wpc\185\00001iri.W51 - 4 3 -
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
James P. Cowley (073 9) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAN BAKER, ) 
) JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF 
Plaintiff, ) DIVORCE 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 914902633DA 
LUJUANA BAKER, ) 
) Judge David S. Young 
Defendant. ) 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant and their respective 
counsel appeared for trial before the Honorable David S. Young, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court at the hour of 8: 00 a. m. on 
Thursday, March 26, 1992. The parties were sworn and testified. 
Exhibits were received. The parties entered into a stipulation 
on the record. The Court has heretofore made and entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based upon the matters 
on file herein, the testimony of the parties, the Exhibits 
received into evidence, the stipulation of the parties and the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered in 
this matter and good cause appearing, the Court now makes and 
enters this Judgment and Decree of Divorce: 
1. The parties are each given and granted a Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony and 
divorcing each from the other. This divorce shall be final upon 
entry of this Judgment. 
2. There is awarded to the Defendant the care, 
custody and control of the two minor children who are issue of 
the marriage, to wit: 
Camille Ann born Jan. 4, 1983, 9 years of age 
Dannie born December 5, 1983, 8 years of age 
There is reserved to the Plaintiff liberal and 
generous rights of visitation, including the right to visit with 
the children at all reasonable times and places and not less 
than the amount established in the visitation policy adopted by 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. The Defendant shall keep the Plaintiff informed 
as to the health, education, welfare and social and religious 
development of the children and the Plaintiff shall have open 
and free access to the health, education and religious records 
of the children. The Defendant shall consult with and advise 
the Plaintiff about major decisions that affect the children. 
Without diminishing Defendant' s authority and responsibility as 
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the custodial parent, she shall listen to and consider 
recommendations and suggestions of the Plaintiff with respect to 
the children. Neither party shall, by word or conduct, 
denigrate the other to or in the presence of the children and 
each party shall encourage an open, free and loving relationship 
between the children and the other party. 
3. The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant as child 
support, for the use and benefit of the two (2) minor children, 
the sum of $1,600.00 per month, commencing with the month of 
April 1992. Eight hundred dollars ($800.00) thereof shall be 
payable on or before the 5th day of each month and the other 
$800.00 shall be payable on or before the 20th day of each 
month. In addition to the child support herein provided for, 
the Plaintiff shall, for so long as he has a duty to pay child 
support, maintain insurance upon his life with unencumbered 
death benefits in the amount of $150,000.00 payable at the 
option of the Plaintiff to the Defendant, the children, their 
guardian or a corporate trustee for the use and benefit of the 
children. 
4. The Plaintiff shall maintain health and accident 
insurance for the use and benefit of the children. The 
Defendant shall pay all uninsured, routine medical and dental 
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expenses, including routine office visits, examinations and 
immunizations. The parties shall each pay one-half (1/2) of all 
other reasonable and necessary uninsured medical and dental 
expenses. The Plaintiff shall be entitled to take a credit 
against his child support obligation in an amount equal to the 
cost incurred by him in maintaining the health and accident 
insurance for the benefit of the children. The Plaintiff shall 
provide the Defendant with written verification by his employer 
establishing the cost incurred by the Plaintiff for maintaining 
health and accident insurance for the children only. 
5. Commencing with the month of April 1992, the 
Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant, as alimony, the sum of 
$1,200.00 per month. Commencing with the month after the month 
in which the residential property referred to in paragraph 9 
below is sold or with the month of October 1992 (whichever 
occurs first), the alimony herein provided for shall be 
increased to the sum of $1,400.00 per month. One-half (1/2) of 
the alimony shall be payable on or before the 5th day of each 
month and one-half (1/2) shall be payable on or before the 20th 
day of each month. The alimony herein provided for shall 
terminate upon the first of the following events: 
a. The death of either party; 
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b. The remarriage of the Defendant; 
c. Cohabitation by the Defendant under 
circumstances that would cause alimony to be terminated in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
6. The alimony and child support herein provided for 
is premised and predicated upon current total gross compensation 
of the Plaintiff (including bonuses and car allowance) of 
$150,120.00 per year and is further premised and predicated on 
the fact that while the Defendant is a trained, educated, 
qualified and certified school teacher, she is currently 
unemployed and presently has no income. 
7. For each calendar year (commencing with calendar 
year 1992 and thereafter) that the Plaintiff has completely paid 
and discharged his obligation for child support, Plaintiff shall 
be entitled to take and claim the minor child, Dannie, as a 
dependent exemption deduction upon Plaintiff's federal and state 
income tax returns. 
8. The parties shall cooperate with each other and 
the Defendant shall furnish information to the Plaintiff 
necessary to complete the 1991 federal and state income tax 
returns. If there is a net refund of both the federal and state 
income taxes, then fifty percent (50%) of the net refund shall 
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belong to the Plaintiff and fifty percent (50%) shall belong to 
the Defendant. If further federal and state taxes are due for 
calendar year 1991, the Plaintiff s.hall pay and discharge the 
same. 
9. The residence of the parties at 11718 South 
Eureka Way, South Jordan, Utah, is awarded to the Plaintiff, who 
shall immediately list the same for sale with a real estate 
broker. Pending the sale of the subject property, the Defendant 
and the minor children shall reside therein and shall care for 
and maintain the premises. Commencing with the month of April 
1992 and continuing through the month of September 1992, or 
until the property is sold (whichever occurs first), the 
Defendant shall pay upon the mortgage indebtedness on said 
property the sum of $1,000.00 per month and the Plaintiff shall, 
each month during said time period, pay the balance of the 
mortgage payment. If the property has not been sold by the end 
of September 1992, then thereafter and commencing with the month 
of October 1992, the Defendant shall make the full monthly 
mortgage payment on said property until the same is sold. The 
award of the residential property is subject to the mortgage 
thereon which (except as otherwise provided herein), shall be 
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paid and discharged by the Plaintiff who shall save and hold the 
Defendcint harmless therefrom. 
10. The household furnishings, fixtures, appliances 
and personal property located in the residential property may be 
used by the Defendant and minor children for so long as they 
reside in the property. At such time as the Defendant vacates 
the property, the parties shall divide the furnishings, 
fixtures, appliances and personal property between them on an 
equal basis. 
11. By a separately entered and appropriate Qualified 
Domestic Relation Order(s), there shall be divided equally 
between the parties, all pension, profit sharing, retirement, 
IRA, thrift plans, savings plans and other such benefits and 
plans in which the parties have an interest(s) and the value(s) 
thereof as of the date hereof. 
12. There is awarded to the Defendant as her sole and 
separate property, her jewelry, clothing and personal effects, 
together with the 1990 Ford Bronco operated by the Defendant. 
The award to the Defendant of the motor vehicle herein described 
is subject to a debt thereon in the approximate amount of 
$14,500.00 payable to Plaintiff's credit union at the rate of 
$396. 00 per month. Commencing with the month of April 1992, the 
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Defendant shall promptly pay, when due, the monthly payments to 
the credit union until said indebtedness has been discharged. 
13. The Defendant shall pay and discharge all debts 
and liabilities incurred by her since the separation of the 
parties in May, 1991, and not otherwise provided for herein and 
she shall save and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
14. In addition to the family residence referred to 
in paragraph 9 above, the Plaintiff is awarded as his sole and 
separate property, the following specific assets: 
a. Approximately 2V acres of undeveloped land 
in Price, Utah; 
b. A 1991 GMC operated by the Plaintiff, 
subject to the debt thereon in the approximate amount of 
$19,000.00 which the Plaintiff shall pay and discharge; 
c. A 1989 Ford Bronco operated by the Plaintiff 
subject to the debt thereon in the approximate amount of 
$10, 800. 00 which the Plaintiff shall pay and discharge; 
d. A horse identified as a 2 year old filly; 
e. A horse identified as D. B. Cooper; 
f. All of the tack and related equipment for 
the horses; 
g. The garden, power and hand tools; 
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h. U. S. Savings Bonds with a value of 
approximately $600.00; 
i. The Plaintiff's clothing, jewelry and 
personal effects; 
j . A bonus and promotion payment recently 
received by the Plaintiff incident to his 1991 employment in the 
net sum of approximately $12,000.00; 
15. The Plaintiff shall pay and discharge the 
following additional debts and obligations and shall save and 
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom: 
a. K-plus loan no. 1 owing to 
Pacific Power (1,762.00) 
b. K-plus loan no. 2 owing t o 
Pacific Power (926.00) 
c. Loan payable to Mr. and Mrs. 
Paul Baker (94,389.00) 
d. Loan payable to Pacific Power (6,700.00) 
e. Payable to Dr. Hicks (560.00) 
f. Payable to Olivette Furniture (2,000.00) 
g. Plaintiff's attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in this action 
h. Payable to Defendant7 s attorney 
in this action to apply upon 
attorney7 s fees and costs incurred 
by the Defendant in this action (2,500.00) 
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i. The Plaintiff shall pay and 
discharge all debts and liabilities 
incurred by him since the sepa-
ration of the parties in May, 
1991, and not otherwise provided 
for herein and he shall save and 
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
16. The parties are ordered and directed to take such 
action and make and execute all such documents and do such 
things as are necessary to implement the provisions hereof. 
17. An Order to Withhold and Deliver Income shall be 
entered when, and if, Defendant becomes delinquent in his 
support obligation, and appropriate income withholding 
procedures shall apply to existing and future payors, and all 
withheld income shall be submitted to the Court, or to the 
Office of Recovery Services under the provisions of §62A-11-401 
et seq. , Utah Code Ann.
 % 
DATED this /fa day of Ha%eh, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
v i d S. Young, J u d g e 
K e l l i e F. W i l l i a m s 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
/ 
D a t e 
- 1 0 -
g : \ w p l \ 2 1 3 \ O 0 0 0 1 b s r . W 5 i 
PLAINTIFF'S EARNINGS AND PLAINTIFF'S SUGGESTED 
ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION THEREOF 
Annual 
Plaintiff's current gross annual income 
Includes car allowance of $7,800 and 
average bonus 
Less FICA withheld 
Withholding for health and accident insurance 
Withholding for accidental death 
Withholding for dental insurance 
Withholding for life insurance 
Withholding for vision insurance 
Car payment on GMC at $452.00 per month 
Car payment on Bronco at $264.00 per month 
Monthly payment to Olivette Furniture - $200.00 
Repayment of K-plus no. 1 loan @ $135.00 per month 
Repayment of K-plus no. 2 loan @ $57.00 per month 
Pay Dr. Hicks at $25.00 per month 
Payment to Paul Baker at $750.00 per month 
Pay Pacific Power at $400.00 per month 
Child support for two children at $1,600.00 
per month 
$150, 
(5,1 
(4 
(2 
(1 
(8 
(1 
(5,4 
(3,1 
(2,4 
(1,6 
(6 
(3 
(12,0 
(4,8 
120 
15. 
68. 
10. 
92. 
21. 
20. 
24. 
68. 
00. 
20. 
84. 
00. 
00. 
00. 
.00 
00) 
00) 
00) 
00) 
00) 
00) 
00) 
00) 
00) 
00) 
00) 
00) 
00) 
00) 
(19,284.00) 
Balance available for tax and support of the parties $ 93,514.00 
Suggested alimony for Mrs. Baker at $1,400.00 
per month (16,800.00) 
Federal and state taxes payable by Mr. Baker 
calculated as follows: 
Gross income 
Less alimony 
Less 2 personal exemptions 
and itemized deductions 
Taxable income 
$150,120.00 
(16,800.00) 
(5,000.001 
$128,320.00 
Federal and state tax at 
combined estimated rate 
Federal & state income tax 
Net cash available for Mr. Baker 
x.33 
Monthly 
($42,345.001 
($34,009.00) 
$ 2,834.00 
g:\wpl\213\0000177t.W51 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT^ 
Month Annual 
Net cash for Mrs. Baker and children 
Child support $1,600.00 $19,284.00 
Alimony 1,400.00 16,800.00 
$3,000.00 $36,084.00 
With alimony and child support at this level and 
with Mrs. Baker filing as head of household and 
taking the children as exemptions, she will not 
incur Federal or State income tax liabilities. 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
James P. Cowley (0739) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAN BAKER, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 914902633DA 
LUJUANA BAKER, ) 
) Judge David S. Young 
Defendant. ) 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant and their respective 
counsel appeared for trial before the Honorable David S. Young, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court at the hour of 8: 00 a. m. on 
Thursday, March 26, 1992. The parties were sworn and testified. 
Exhibits were received. The parties entered into a stipulation 
on the record. Based on the foregoing and based upon the 
matters on file herein, the Court now makes and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are both actual and 
bonafide residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and were 
g: \wpl\213\0OOOlbsr.W51 
for more than three (3) months immediately prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each 
other on June 8, 1970. 
3. There are irreconcilable differences between the 
parties making a continuation of the marital relationship 
impossible. 
4. Three (3) children have been born as issue of 
this marriage. One (1) of the children is beyond her eighteenth 
(18th) birthday. Two (2) of the children are minors and reside 
with the Defendant. Their names, birthdays and ages are as 
follows: 
Camille Ann born Jan. 5, 1983, 9 years of age 
Dannie born December 6, 1983, 8 years of age 
5. The Defendant is a good mother and the care, 
custody and control of the two (2) minor children should be 
awarded to the Defendant, reserving to the Plaintiff the right 
to visit with said children at all reasonable times and places. 
6. The Plaintiff is employed and his current annual 
gross compensation, including car allowance and anticipated 
bonuses, is $150,120.00. The Plaintiff has been the primary 
wage earner during the marriage. The parties' incomes for the 
previous years, including bonuses and relocation reimbursement, 
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are as follows: 1990 - $169,248; 1989 - $120,434; 1988 -
$111,715; 1987 - $92,674; 1986 - $76,149. 
7. The Defendant is an educated, trained and 
qualified teacher in the Utah public school system and she is in 
good health. She last worked and last taught a full contract 
year for the school year 1989-1990. She has worked during the 
majority of the parties' marriage as a school teacher or 
secretary. She is currently uncertified, but can recertify upon 
completion of three (3) academic hours of training which she can 
readily obtain between now and the beginning of the 1992-1993 
school year. The Defendant is currently unemployed and 
presently has no income. 
8. The Defendant testified that her monthly expenses 
are $4,, 800. 00 per month, excluding her car payment which is 
$396.00, for a total of $5,196.00 per month. The Defendant 
testified that those expenses include the expenses attendant to 
herself, her two children, and the two grandchildren residing in 
her home. The expenses related to the two grandchildren are not 
relevant to, nor should they be considered in, the Court' s award 
of alimony and child support. 
9. Premised and predicated upon the total gross 
compensation of the Plaintiff (including bonuses and car 
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allowance) of $1507 120.00 and further premised and predicated 
upon the fact that the Defendant is currently unemployed and 
currently has no income, reasonable child support to be paid by 
Plaintiff to Defendant for the benefit of the two (2) children 
is $1,600.00 per month. The income level of the Plaintiff 
exceeds the guideline amounts set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-
45-1 and the Court finds $1,600.00 to be a reasonable sum. 
Given the Plaintiff's current income and the fact that the 
Defendant is not currently employed and is without income and 
given the debts and expenses of the parties, most of which must 
be paid by the Plaintiff and given the needs of the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant, reasonable alimony to be paid by the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant is $1,400.00 per month. 
10. The Plaintiff has available to him through his 
place of employment, health and accident insurance coverage for 
the benefit of the minor children. 
11. The 1991 federal and state income tax returns 
have not been filed but it is to the benefit of the parties that 
they cooperate and file joint returns for calendar year 1991. 
12. The Plaintiff has, or can obtain, insurance upon 
his life with unencumbered death benefits in the amount of 
$150,000.00 and it is in the interest of the children that he do 
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so for purposes of providing support for the children in the 
event of Plaintiff s untimely death. 
13. The assets and (liabilities) of the parties 
accumulated and incurred during the marriage and currently 
outstanding and an equitable division thereof is as follows: 
No. Description Mrs. Baker Mr. Baker 
(a) Residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way $183,000.00 
(b) Mortgage on residence (143,000.00) 
(c) Household furnishings and 
fixtures at residence $15,000.00 15,000.00 
(d) 2 3/4 acres in Price, Utah 6,000.00 
(e) 1990 Ford Bronco operated 
by Mrs. Baker 17,000.00 
(f) Purchase debt on 1990 Ford Bronco (14,500.00) 
(g) 1991 GMC operated by Mr. Baker 18,000.00 
(h) Purchase debt on 1991 GMC (19,000.00) 
(i) 1989 Ford Bronco 12,000.00 
(j) Purchase debt on 1989 Bronco (10,800.00) 
(k) Horse - 2 year filly 2,000.00 
(1) Horse - D. B. Cooper 1,500.00 
(m) Garden, power & hand tools 2,000.00 
(n) Tack for horses 400.00 
(o) U.S. Savings Bonds 600.00 
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(p) K-plus l o a n no. 1 owing t o 
Pacific Power (1,762.00) 
(q) K-plus l o a n no. 2 owing t o 
Pacific Power (926,00) 
(r) Loan payable to Plaintiff's parents (94,389.00) 
(s) Loan payable to Pacific Power (6,700.00) 
(t) Payable to Dr. Hicks (560.00) 
(u) Payable to Olivette Furniture (2,000.00) 
(v) Estimated attorney' s fees for 
Mr. Baker (2,500.00) 
(w) Estimated attorney' s fees for 
Mrs. Baker (2,500.00) 
(x) Clothing and personal effects 
each party - not valued - NV NV 
NET VALUES $17, 500. 00 5(43, 637. 00) 
(y) Together with an equal division between the parties of 
all 401K, pension and retirement funds of both parties 
per appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations and other 
necessary orders. 
14. The obligation set forth in subparagraph (r) of 
paragraph 14 above, which is a loan repayable to the Plaintiff s 
parents in the amount of $94,389.00 (which does not include any 
interest), is a marital debt of the parties which must be 
considered in the division of the marital estate and which 
accordingly reduces the marital net worth of the parties to a 
negative net worth. The debt was incurred from time to time 
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commencing in 1984 and some payments have been made thereon as 
evidenced by Defendant' s Exhibit 3. Since Plaintiff is charged 
with the responsibility for repayment of that debt to 
Plaintiff's parents, the division of the marital net worth, as 
provided for in paragraph 14 above, leaves the Plaintiff with a 
negative net worth of $43,637.00, while the assets being awarded 
to the Defendant have a positive net worth of $17,500.00. The 
Court finds this imbalance to be necessary and equitable because 
the Plaintiff is the only party who has earnings with which the 
liabilities of the parties, as set forth in paragraph 14 above, 
can be paid. 
15. While there was some evidence that Defendant's 
parents have, during the course of the marriage, provided some 
support to the Plaintiff and Defendant, there was no evidence 
that it was other than a gift and there was no evidence that 
Defendant' s parents expected the repayment thereof. 
16. At the time of trial, the Plaintiff had in his 
bank account the approximate sum of $12,000.00 resulting from 
receipt by him of a recent bonus. The $12,000.00 is not 
scheduled as a separate asset because it is part of and included 
in Plaintiff's income stream of $150,120.00. 
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17. Because of the substantial debt of the parties 
and the resulting negative net worth, the parties cannot afford 
to maintain and make the mortgage payments on the residence at 
11718 S. Eureka Way and the same must be sold at the earliest 
possible time. The parties stipulated that the marital 
residence has a value of $183,000.00. Pending sale, it is 
reasonable that the Defendant be permitted temporary possession 
of said real property. The monthly mortgage obligation is 
approximately $1,665.00. Pending sale, it is reasonable that 
the Defendant pay $1,000.00 of that monthly mortgage obligation 
and the Plaintiff pay the balance of the mortgage until October 
1, at which time, if the home is not yet sold, the Defendant 
should pay the entire mortgage obligation. During the period 
that the Plaintiff is contributing to the mortgage obligation, 
it is reasonable that the alimony be reduced to the rate of 
$1, 200. 00 per month. 
18. The parties stipulated (and the Court finds the 
stipulation reasonable) to the effect that Plaintiff would pay 
to the Defendant, for the use and benefit of her attorneys, an 
additional sum of $2,500.00 which is in addition to the previous 
attorney' s fees paid by the Plaintiff for the benefit and use of 
the Defendant m the amount of $1, 500. 00. 
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19. The parties stipulated that commencing with 
calendar year 1992 and thereafter and for so long as Plaintiff 
has completely paid and discharged his obligation for child 
support, Plaintiff would be entitled to take and claim the minor 
child, Dannie, as a dependent exemption deduction upon 
Plaintiff's federal and state income tax returns and that 
Defendant would be entitled to take and claim the minor child, 
Camille Ann, as a dependent exemption deduction upon her federal 
and state income tax returns. 
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Court now makes 
and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
20. The parties are each entitled and should each be 
granted a Judgment and Decree divorcing each party from the 
other. 
21. The Defendant should be granted the care, custody 
and control of the two (2) minor children who are issue of the 
marriage. There should be reserved to the Plaintiff, liberal 
and generous visitation rights. 
22. The Court should make and enter its Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce and Order, consistent with and including and 
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! 
embracing the matters that are set forth and implicit within the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and resulting equitably therefrom. 
DATED this f{0 day of *£$£&, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO, FORM: 
m 
David S. Young, Judge 
/; /..' 
Yfellie ,/F/ 'Williams Date 
Attorne'y for Defendant 
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other itau hit igreed to pey expeoies incurred by 
the ittomey general in bringing the action. 
(3) The idininittritor may request thit the art-
orney feneni of mother stite or any other person 
bring in action in the name of the administrator in 
the other state to enforce the unclaimed property 
laws of this state. This state shall pay an expenses 
including attorney's fees in any action under this 
subsection. The administrator may agree to pay the 
person bringing the action attorney's fees based in 
whole or in part on a percentage of the value of any 
property recovered in the action. tow 
71-44-36. Interest oa detbMpeflt delivery . Ovil 
penalties - Criminal penalties. 
(1) A person who fails to pay or deliver property 
within the time prescribed by this chapter shall pay 
to the administrator interest at the annual rate of 
2*k above the local prime lending rate on the pro-
perty or value thereof from the date the property 
should have been paid or delivered. 
(2) A person who willfully fails to file any 
report, or perform a duty required under this 
chapter, or to pay or deliver property to the admi-
nistrator as required under this chapter shall pay a 
civil penalty equal to 207t of the value of the pro-
perty that should have been paid or delivered. 
(3) A person who willfully refuses after written 
demand by the administrator to pay or deliver pro-
perty to the administrator as required under this 
chapter is guilty of a class B misdemeanor and upon 
conviction may be punished by a fine of not more 
than $2,000. tft3 
78-44-37. Agreement to pay compensation to 
recover reported property inenforceahk. 
AU agreements to pay compensation to recover or 
assist in the recovery of property reported under 
section 78-44-18, made within 24 months after 
the date payment or delivery is made under section 
78-44-20, are unenforceable. m? 
78-44-38. Property in foreign conntry or from 
foreign transaction exempt* 
This chapter does not apply to any property held 
in a foreign country and arising out of a foreign 
transaction. ms 
78-44-39. Dnties nnder prior law • Property to 
he tednded hi taifiai report 
(1) This chapter does not relieve a holder of a 
duty to report, nay, or deliver property arising 
before July 1, 1983. Such holder who fails to 
comply before that date is subject to the applicable 
enforcement and penalty provisions in existence at 
that time and those provisions are continued in 
effect for the purpose of this subsection, subject to 
subsection 78-44-30(2). 
(2) The initial report to be filed under this 
chapter for property that was not required to be 
reported before July 1, 1983, but which is subject to 
this chapter shall include all items of property that 
would have been presumed abandoned during the 
ten-year period prior to July 1, 1983, as if this 
chapter had been in effect during that period. tttJ 
78-44-40. Application and construction of 
chapter. 
This chapter shall be applied and construed as to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the 
law with respect to the subject of this chapter 
among states enacting it. ita? 
Code 7MS4. 
Chapter 45. Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Ad 
7845-1. Short title. 
78-45-2. DtflaWoat. 
78-454. Doty of ana. 
784M. Doty of wooua. 
7845-4.1 Doty of •tcppareat to sopport stepchild -
Effect of temlostioo of mmf\a%t or COOIOMMI law 
itlatioojoip. 
78-45-4.2. Natoral or adoptive poreot lot primary 
obttfadoo of sopport - Right of stepparcoi to recover 
sopport. 
78-45-4J. Ward of state - Primary obttgatioa to 
npport. 
78-45*5. Doty of obttgor regardleai of preeeacc or 
wrioVoce of obMgee. 
78-45-*. District coort Jojitdktfoo. 
78-45-7. Doteraioatioo of aaaooot of fopport • 
AIM urn f t formal* for temporary fopport. 
78-45-7.1. Medical tod Oeatai ezpeoaet of depeodoat 
chMrea • AimgoJag responsibility for paymeat • 
lojoraoce coverage. 
78-454. Cootteafog jarioActJoa. 
78-45-f. Eoiorcecoeot of right of sopport. 
78-454.1. Repealed. 
78-45-f J. Coooty attoroey to aaaist oblgee. 
78-45-18. Appcak. 
78-45-11. Hoabood aad wife prirOeged commaakatkm 
wapfrVtble - Competeocy of spoojes. 
78-45-12. Rights are • sddtooo to thooe preteaHy 
exbtiog. 
78-45*13. loiefpretatioo tad cooatncHoo. 
78-4M. Short title. 
This act may be cited i s the Uniform Civil Liab-
ility for Support Act. iff? 
78-45-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) 'State' includes any state, territory or posse-
ssion of the United States, the District of Columbia 
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(2) 'Obligor* means any person owing a duty of 
support. 
(3) 'Obligee* means any person to whom a duty 
of support is owed. 
<4) 'Child* means a son or daughter under the 
age of 18 years and a son or daughter of whatever 
age who is incapacitated from earning a hving and 
without sufficient means. 
(5) 'Parent' includes a natural parent, in adop-
tive parent, or a stepparent, 
(6) 'Stepparent* means a person ceremonially 
married to a child's natural or adoptive custodial 
parent who is not the child's natural or adoptive 
parent or one living with the natural or adoptive 
parents as a common law spouse, whose common 
law marriage was entered into in a state which rec-
ognizes the validity of common law marriages. 
(7) 'Stepchild* means any child with a stepparent. 
(8) 'Earnings* means compensation paid or 
payable for personal services, whether denominated 
as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, 
and specifically include periodic payment pursuant 
to pension or retirement programs, or insurance 
policies of any type. Earnings shall specifically 
include all gain derived from capital, from labor, or 
from both combined, including profit gained 
through sale or conversion of capital assets. mi 
78-45-3. Doty of maa. 
Every man shall support his child; and he shall 
support his wife when she is in need. tor* 
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78-45-4. Jodldal Code 
78-45-4. Daty el wosaaa. 
Every woman shall support her child; and she 
shall support her husband when he is in need. tm 
71-45-4.1 Duty of stepparent to support stepchild 
• Effect of termination of marriage or commoa 
law relationship. 
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same 
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required 
to support a child. Provided, however, that upon 
the terminatjion of the marriage or common law 
relationship between the stepparent and the child's 
natural or adoptive parent the support obligation 
shall terminate. ust 
78-45-4.2. Nataral or adoptive pat-eat has 
primary obligation of support - Right of 
stepparent to recover support. 
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the 
natural parent or adoptive parent of the primary 
obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has 
the same right to recover support for a stepchild 
from the natural or adoptive parent as any other 
obligee. i m 
78-45*4.3. Ward of state - Primary obligation to 
support. 
Notwithstanding section 78-45-2, a natural or 
an adoptive parent or stepparent whose minor child 
has become a ward of the state is not relieved of the 
primary obligation to support that child until he 
reaches the age of majority. my 
78-45-5. Daty of obligor regardless of presence or 
residence of obligee. 
An obligor present or resident in this state has the 
duty of support as defined in this act regardless of 
the presence or residence of the obligee. ifS7 
71-45-6. District court jurisdiction. 
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all 
proceedings brought under this act. i*s7 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support -
Assessment formula for temporary support. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the 
amount granted by prior court order unless there 
has been a material change of circumstance on the 
part of the obligor or obligee. 
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a mate-
rial change in circumstances has occurred, the court 
in determining the amount of prospective support, 
shall consider all relevant factors including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(0 the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others. 
(3) When no prior court order exists, the court 
snail determine and assess all arrearages based upon, 
but not limited to: 
(a) the amount of public assistance received by 
the obligee, if any; 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and 
necessarily expended in support of spouse and chil-
dren. 
(4) In determining the amount of prospective 
support on an ex parte or other motion for tempo-
rary support, the court shall use a uniform statewide 
assessment formula, adjusted for regional differe-
nces, prior to rendering the support order. The 
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formula shall provide for aM relevant factors which 
can be readily identified and shall allow for reaso-
nable deductions from the obligor's earnings for 
taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses. 
The assessment formula shall be established by the 
Department of Social Services and periodically rev-
iewed by the Judicial Council under Subsection 78-
3-21(3). ww 
78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of 
dependent children - Assigning responsibility for 
payment - Insurance coverage. 
When no prior court order exists or the prior 
court order makes no specific provision for the 
payment of medical and dental expenses for depen-
dent children, the court shall include in its order a 
provision assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expe-
nses for the dependent children. If coverage is ava-
ilable at a reasonable cost, the court may also 
include a provision requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and 
dental care insurance for those children. MM 
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction. 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or 
vacate the order of support where justice requires. 
7845-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
(1) The obligee may enforce his right of support 
against the obligor and the state department of 
social services may proceed pursuant to this act or 
any other applicable statute, either on its own behalf 
or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's 
right of support against the obligor. Whenever any 
court action is commenced by the state department 
of social services to enforce payment of the 
obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of 
the attorney general or the county attorney, of the 
county of residence of the ob^gee, to represent that 
department. 
(2) No obligee shall commence any action to 
recover support due or owing that obligee whether 
under this act or any other applicable statute 
without first filing an affidavit with the court at the 
time the action is commenced stating whether that 
obligee has received public assistance from any 
source. If the obligee has received public assistance, 
the obligee shall join the department of social serv-
ices as a party plaintiff in the action. The depart-
ment of social services shall be represented as pro-
videdin subsection (1) of this section. ism 
7845-9.1. lepeaM. MS4 
78-45-9.2. Comity attorney to assist oWigee. 
The county attorney's office shall provide assist-
ance to an obligee desiring to proceed under this act 
in the following manner: 
(1) Provide forms, approved by the judicial 
council of Utah, for an order of wage assignment if 
the obligee is not represented by legal counsel; 
(2) The county attorney's office may charge a fee 
not to exceed S25 for providing assistance to an 
obligee under subsection (1). 
(3) Inform the obligee of the right to file impec-
umously if the obligee is unable to bear the expenses 
of the action and assist the obligee with such filing; 
(4) Advise the obligee of the available methods 
for service of process; and 
(5) Assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a 
hearing before the court. ism 
78-45-10. Appeals. 
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments 
under this act as in other civil actions. ifS7 
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7 M S - 1 1 . Hatband and wife prtrfleged 
commaakatkM inapplicable - Competency of 
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure 
of communications between husband and wife are 
inapplicable under this act. Spouses are competent 
witnesses to testify to any relevant mailer, including 
marriage and parentage. its? 
7S-45-12. Rights are in addition to those 
presently existing. 
The rights herein created are in addition to and 
not in substitution to any other rights. t*S7 
7S-45-13. Interpretation and construction. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as 
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform 
the law of those states which enact it* u$i 
Chapter 45a. Uniform Act on Paternity 
7*45i-l. 
7*45i-2. 
7*45i-3. 
7145*4. 
7145*4. 
7*45*4. 
7*45*-7. 
7*45*4. 
7*45*-f. 
7*45*10. 
7*45a-11. 
7*451-12. 
7*45i-U. 
7*451-14. 
7*45*15. 
7145+14. 
7*45*17. 
ObUg itiois of t*e fither. 
Enforce meat. 
Limititioi o i recovery from tie fitter. 
LimhiUou o i recovery from father's esUte. 
Remedies. 
Time of trill. 
Aatiority for blood tests. 
Sefcctioi of experts. 
Compemtkni of expert wttiestes. 
Effect of test remits. 
Secarity. 
Setnemeat igreemeits. 
Veiie. 
. Uniformity of kiterpretitioi. 
Skort tide. 
Opentioi of act. 
7S-45a-l. ObUgations of the father. 
The father of a child which is or may be born out 
of wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father 
of a child born in wedlock, whether or not the child 
is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the 
mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the 
education, necessary support and funeral expenses 
of the child. A child born out of wedlock includes a 
child born to a married woman by a man other than 
her husband. vm 
7S-45a-2. Enforcement. 
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of 
the mother, child, or the public authority chargeable 
by law with the support of the child. If paternity 
has been determined or has been acknowledged 
according to the laws of this state, the liabilities of 
the father may be enforced in the same or other 
proceedings (1) by the mother, child, or the public 
authority which have furnished or may furnish the 
reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, 
education, necessary support, or funeral expenses, 
and (2) by other persons including private agencies 
to the extent that they have furnished the reasonable 
expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, 
necessary support, or funeral expenses. i*ts 
7S-45a-3. limitation on recovery from the fither. 
The father's liabilities for past education and 
necessary support are limited to a period of four 
years next preceding the commencement of an 
action. 1*5 
7S-45a~4. limitations on recovery from father's 
estate. 
The obligation of the estate of the father for lia-
bilities under this act are limited to amounts accrued 
prior to his death and such sums as may be payable 
for dependency under other laws. t%5 
7 M $ * 5 . Remedies. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action 
under this act and all remedies for the enforcement 
of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confi-
nement for a wife or for education, necessary 
support, or funera) expenses for legitimate children 
apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
modify or revoke a judgment for future education 
and necessary support. All remedies under the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 
are available for enforcement of duties of support 
under this act. 
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support 
against the obligor and the state department of 
WOai services may proceed on behalf of the obligee 
•^ in Its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of 
chapter 45b of this title to enforce that right of 
support against the obligor. In such actions by the 
department, all the provisions of chapter 45b of this 
title shall be equally applicable to this chapter. 
Whenever a court action is commenced by the state 
department of social services, it shall be the duty of 
the attorney general or the county attorney, of the 
county of residence of the obligee, to represent that 
department. ms 
7t-4Sn-i. Time of trial. 
If the issue of paternity is raised in action com-
menced during the pregnancy of the mother, the 
trial shall not, without the consent of the alleged 
father, be held until after the birth or miscarriage 
but during such delay testimony may be perpetrated 
according to the laws of this state. ms 
7M$a-7. Authority for blood tests. . 
The court, upon its own initiative or upon sugg-
estion made by or on behalf of any person whose 
blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party 
to the action made at'a time so as not to delay the 
proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child 
and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any 
party refuses to submit to such tests, the court may 
resolve the question of paternity against such party 
or enforce its order if the rights of others and the 
interests of justice so require. ms 
7M$a-l. Selection of experts. 
The tests shall be made by experts qualified as 
examiners of blood types who shall be appointed by 
the court. The experts shall be called by the court as 
witnesses to testify to their findings and shall be 
subject to cross-examination by the parties. Any 
party or person at whose suggestion the tests have 
been ordered may demand that other experts, qual-
ified as examiners of blood types, perform indepe-
ndent tests under order of court, the results of 
which may be offered in evidence. The number and 
qualifications of such experts shall be determined by 
the court. 1*5 
7*-45i-9. Compensation of expert witnesses. 
The compensation of each expert witness appoi-
nted by the court shall be fixed at a reasonable 
amount. It shall be paid as the court shall order. 
The court may order that it be paid by the parties in 
such proportions and at such times as it shall pres-
cribe. The fee of an expert witness called by a party 
but not appointed by the court shall be paid by the 
party calling him but shall not be taxed as costs in 
the action. ms 
78-4$a-10. Effect of test results. 
If the court fmds that the conclusions of all 
experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the 
tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of 
Pn*o. Stab For Annotations, consult CODE oCo's Annotation Service 355 
Item 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11, 
12, 
13, 
14, 
15, 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
STATEMENT OF ASSETS & (LIABILITIES) 
AND 
PLAINTIFF'S SUGGESTED DIVISION THEREOF 
Description Mrs. Baker 
$15,000.00 
Residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way 
Mortgage on residence 
Household furnishings and 
fixtures at residence 
2 3/4 acres in Price, Utah 
1990 Ford Bronco operated 
by Mrs. Baker 17,000.00 
Purchase debt on 1990 Ford Bronco (14,500.00) 
1991 GMC operated by Mr. Baker 
Purchase debt on 1991 GMC 
1989 Ford Bronco 
Purchase debt on 1989 Bronco 
Horse - 2 year filly 
Horse - D.B. Cooper 
Garden, power & hand tools 
Tack for horses 
U.S. Savings Bonds 
K-plus loan no. 1 owing to 
Pacific Power 
K-plus loan no. 2 owing to 
Pacific Power 
Loan payable to Plaintiff's parents 
Loan payable to Pacific Power 
Payable to Dr. Hicks 
Payable to Olivette Furniture 
Mr. Baker 
$183,000.00 
(143,000.00) 
15,000.00 
6,000.00 
18,000.00 
(19,000.00) 
12,000.00 
(10,800.00) 
2,000.00 
1,500.00 
2,000.00 
400.00 
600.00 
(1,762.00) 
(926.00) 
(94,389.00) 
(6,700.00) 
(560.00) 
g:\wpl\213\0000177t.W51 
22. Estimated attorney's fees for 
Mr. Baker (2,500.00) 
23. Estimated attorney's fees for 
Mrs. Baker (2,500.00) 
24. Loan payable to Defendant's 
parents (33,000.00) 
25. Clothing and personal effects 
each party - not valued - NV NV 
NET VALUES ($15,500.00) $(43,637.00) 
Together with an equal division of all 401K, pension and 
retirement funds of both parties per appropriate Qualified 
Domestic Relations and other orders. 
g:\wpl\213\0000177t.W51 
DAN BAKER v. LDJUANA BAKER 
SCHEDULE OF MARITAL ASSETS 
and 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED PROPERTY DTSTRIBUTION 
ESTIMATED 
FAIR MARKET PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION 
VALUE PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
ASSETS: 
Real Estate 
11718 S. Eureka Way $ 183,000 $ ~ $ 183,000 
Price acreage 6,000 3,000 3,000 
Retirement Accounts 
401(k) and ESOP $ 60,000* $ 32,199 $ 27,801 
Other Assets 
Household Furnishings $ 30,000 $ 15,000 $ 15,000 
Power and Hand Tools 2,000 2,000 
Motor Vehicles 
1989 Ford Bronco 11,150 11,150 
1990 Ford Bronco 12,400 — 12,400 
1991 GMC 19,000 19,000 
Horses (2) 3,500 3,500 
Tack 400 400 
U.S. Savings Bonds 800 400 400 
SUBTOTAL MARITAL ASSETS: $ 328,250 $ 85,649 $ 242,601 
Plaintiff's Lien on Eureka Way $ 20,000 ($ 20,000) 
SUBTOTAL MARITAL ASSETS: $ 328,250 $ 106,649 $ 221,601 
LIABILITIES: 
Mortgage (Eureka Way) $ 143,000 $ — $ 143,000 
1989 Bronco 11,600 11,600 
1990 Bronco 14,000 — 14,000 
GMC 18,500 18,500 
K Plus Loan 1 1,762 1,762 
K Plus Loan 2 926 926 
Pacific Power 6,700 6,700 
Dr. Hicks 560 560 
Olivette Furniture 2,000 2,000 
SUBTOTAL LIABILITIES: ($199,048) ($ 42,048) ($ 157,000) 
NET MARITAL ASSETS: $ 131,202 $ 64,601 $ 64,601 
* approximate value, funds to be used to equalize distribution of 
marital estate 
Each party to pay debts incurred in his or her own name since separation 
Each party to pay any debts associated with his or her parents 
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